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This essay aims at a broad, main-stream account of the literature on inequality and poverty 
measurement in the space of income and, additionally, deals with measures of disparity and 
deprivation in the more expanded domain of capabilities and functionings. In addition to an 
introductory and a concluding part, the paper has four sections. The first of these, on 
measurement of income inequality, deals with preliminary concepts and definitions; a visual 
representation of inequality (the Lorenz curve); real-valued indices of inequality; properties of 
inequality indices; some specific inequality measures; and the relationship between Lorenz, 
welfare, and inequality orderings. The second section, on poverty, deals with the identification 
and aggregation exercises; properties of poverty indices; some specific poverty measures; the 
problem of plurality and unambiguous rankings; poverty measures and anti-poverty policy; and 
other issues in the measurement of poverty. The third section considers aspects of both 
congruence and conflict in the relationship amongst poverty, inequality, and welfare. The final 
substantive section advances the rationale for a more comprehensive assessment of human well-
being than is afforded by the income perspective, it briefly reviews measurement concerns 
relating to generalized indices of deprivation and disparity, and it discusses the data and policy 
implications of the more expansive view of well-being adopted in the section. 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper we shall take a rapid overview of certain salient issues in the measurement 
of inequality and poverty—two major sources of social ‘illfare’. While the intention is 
to assign each of the two topics the same importance, this may not be reflected in the 
final outcome (which seems somewhat to favour ‘poverty’ over ‘inequality’) when 
judged according to the amount of space allocated to the two topics: the space-
allocation pattern, it must be clarified, is largely a function of the expository demands—
as they have seemed to present themselves—confronting the author. Both subjects are 
immensely vast, and built on foundations of considerable philosophical and conceptual 
import which, however, we shall have little space to review here. The best one can do is 
to point the interested reader toward Sen’s (1981a, 1992) assessments of the conceptual 
underpinnings of the notions of poverty and inequality respectively. Our own concerns 
here will be restricted to issues in measurement, and that, principally though certainly 
not exclusively, in the space of incomes. This is not so much because of any underlying 
view to the effect that income is the most relevant dimension in which to measure 
inequality and poverty, as because this essay is primarily a survey of the literature; and 
the literature on inequality and poverty has, as it happens, concerned itself very largely 
with measurement in the income dimension. 
In discussing inequality and poverty measures as well-being (or rather ‘ill-being’) 
indicators, a two-fold approach will be adopted. First, holding constant the dimension 
(say income) in which measurement is undertaken, the indicator will be varied, so as to 
furnish an idea of the greater or lesser adequacy with which alternative indicators 
capture features of aggregate well-being. This would call for a description of the more 
significantly desirable properties of inequality and poverty indices, and an assessment of 
which indices satisfy what properties. Second, holding the indicator fixed, the 
dimension in which measurement is undertaken will be varied, so as to furnish an idea 
of the greater or lesser appropriateness of alternative ‘spaces’ in which to assess 
aggregate well-being. This would call for a consideration of measurement in non-
income dimensions—such as in the space of capabilities and functionings—in addition 
to the income dimension. Simply as a guide to unambiguous usage, the terms 
‘inequality’ and ‘poverty’ will, in this essay, be generally reserved for the space of 
incomes, while the terms ‘disparity’ and ‘deprivation’ will be employed for more 
inclusive spaces. 
A select list of very fine surveys of issues in inequality measurement is constituted by 
Sen (1973, 1992), Kakwani (1980a), Anand (1983), Foster (1985), Shorrocks (1988), 
and Foster and Sen (1997). A similar list for issues in poverty measurement would 
include Sen (1979, 1981a), Anand (1983), Foster (1984), Kakwani (1980b, 1984), 
Donaldson and Weymark (1986), Atkinson (1987), Seidl (1988), Ravallion (1994), and 
Zheng (1997). When it comes to assessing deprivation and disparity in more general 
spaces than solely income, the reader should consult, amongst others, Morris (1979), 
Sen (1980, 1981b, 1984, 1985a), Sen, Muellbauer, Kanbur, Hart and Williams (1987), 
Dasgupta (1993), Anand and Sen (1995), McGillivray and White (1993), Qizilbash 
(1996), Majumdar and Subramanian (2001), and Subramanian and Majumdar (2002).   2
2 Inequality  measurement 
2.1 Preliminary  concepts   
For specificity, we shall throughout work with the domain of incomes as the one in 
which inequality will be assessed. A fundamental unit of consideration will be an 
income vector. An income vector x is a list of n non-negative incomes (x1,…,xi,…xn), 
where xi (i = 1,…,n) stands for the income of person i in a community of n individuals. 
The set of individuals whose incomes are represented in the vector x will be designated 
by N(x); n(x) will stand for the dimensionality of x; and µ(x) ≡  (1/n(x))Σ i=1
n(x)xi will 
stand for the mean of the incomes in x. What we have just discussed is a discrete 
income distribution. On occasion, it is helpful to work with a continuous distribution: 
here, x will stand for a random variable signifying income; f(x) is the density function of 
x (that is, the proportion of the population with income x); F(x) is the cumulative density 
function of x (that is, the proportion of the population with incomes not exceeding x); 
and F1(x) is the first-moment distribution function of x (that is, the share in total income 
of units with incomes not exceeding x). For a clear statement of concepts and 
definitions, the reader should consult Kakwani (1980a). 
2.2  A visual representation of inequality: the Lorenz curve 
One of the clearest ways of obtaining a visual picture of inequality in the distribution of 
incomes is to plot the Lorenz curve (due to Lorenz, 1905) in the unit square. The Lorenz 
curve is just the plot of the first moment distribution function F1(x) against the 
cumulative density function F(x). If income is perfectly equally divided, then it is clear 
that the Lorenz curve will coincide with the diagonal of the unit square. But a typical, 
unequal distribution will be represented by a Lorenz curve that lies below the diagonal, 
and is convex in shape. The more unequal a distribution, the further away from the 
diagonal the Lorenz curve will lie. For the case of complete concentration, the Lorenz 
curve will be described by the two equal sides of the right-angled triangle of which the 
diagonal of the unit square is the hypotenuse. 
Given a discrete, non-decreasingly ordered n-vector of incomes x = (x1,…xi,…,xn),  
the Lorenz curve—noting that µ(x) is the mean of x—can be derived as a plot   
of the following points: (0,0); (1/n, x1/nµ); (2/n, (x1 + x2)/nµ);  …;  ((n – 1)/n,  
(x1 + x2 +…+ xn-1)/nµ); (1,1): these points, connected by straight lines, will then yield a 
‘piece-wise linear’ Lorenz curve. In Figure 1 I have drawn the Lorenz curves for three 
hypothetical, unequal distributions x, y, and z. I shall now define the binary relation of 
Lorenz dominance, designated by L. Given any two distributions x and y, we shall say x 
Lorenz-dominates y, written xLy, if and only if the Lorenz curve for x lies somewhere 
inside, and nowhere outside, the Lorenz curve for y. In the discrete case, for two equi-
dimensional non-decreasingly ordered n-vectors of income x and y, we shall say xLy 
holds whenever Σ j=1
ixj ≥  Σ j=1
iyj for every i = 1,…,n and there exists at least one i for 
which Σ j=1
ixj > Σ j=1
iyj. If x Lorenz-dominates y, then it seems reasonable to conclude 
that x has unambiguously less inequality than y. Can any two distributions always be 
ranked according to the Lorenz-dominance relation? No. Note from Figure 1 that while 
it is certainly true that xLy and xLz, we can neither say yLz nor zLy: the relation L 
cannot rank intersecting Lorenz curves.   3
Figure 1 The Lorenz curve 
 
What are the properties of the relation L? L is irreflexive, that is, there is no x such that 
xLx holds; it is asymmetric, that is, for all x, y, xLy implies [not yLx]; it is transitive, 
that is, for all x, y, and z, if xLy and yLz, then xLz; but L, as we have seen, is not 
complete, in the sense that given any distinct x and y, it is not necessarily true that either 
xLy or yLx should hold. A binary relation like L, which is irreflexive, asymmetric, 
transitive and incomplete, is called a strict partial ordering. The point to note is that the 
ordering is partial: this may well be how it should be, but nevertheless, if we were to 
provisionally view the completeness of a binary relation to be a desired virtue, then the 
question arises: how do we secure the possibility of obtaining an inequality ordering 
over all distributions of income that we may be interested in? This question is addressed 
in the following sub-section. 
2.3 Real-valued  indices of inequality 
For every positive integer n, let Xn to be the set of non-negative n-vectors of income x; 
and let X be the set ∪ nXn. If R is the set of reals, then an inequality index is a mapping 
I: X →  R, such that, for every x∈ X, I(x) specifies a real number that is intended to 
capture the extent of inequality in the vector x. The (arguable) advantage with a real-
valued index of inequality is that it precipitates a complete ordering over income 
distributions, which follows from the fact that any two real numbers are always 
comparable in terms of the ‘>’, ‘=’, or ‘<’ relationship. (One says ‘arguable’, because 
(0,0) (1,0) 
(1,1)  (0,1) 
xLy and xLz, but neither yLz nor zLy 
x 
y 
z   4
the property of ‘completeness’ in a binary relation could be an over-praised attraction: 
as Sen has repeatedly pointed out, in a variety of contexts, it is not necessarily a virtue 
to force comparability on a pair of alternatives which are not inherently comparable. 
Further, there is always the possibility of loss of relevant information in the process of 
aggregation.) 
How do we choose among alternative inequality indices? A means to this end resides in 
recognizing the usefulness of first specifying what we may think are desirable properties 
for such measures. The properties of inequality indices we shall review in the following 
sub-section have a fair measure of support from scholars working in the area. The 
ensuing exposition draws considerably on Shorrocks (1988) and Anand (1983). 
2.4  Properties of inequality measures 
If the sorts of populations we are dealing with are homogenous populations, then the 
symmetry axiom (Axiom S), which requires an inequality index to be invariant with 
respect to an interpersonal permutation of incomes, has a certain natural appeal. Second, 
we may wish to specify a lower bound of zero for an inequality index, and reserve this 
number for a distribution in which income is perfectly equally divided: this is the 
normalization property (Axiom N). Third, it is of the essence for an inequality measure 
to satisfy the transfer property (Axiom T), which is the requirement that the inequality 
index should register a decline in value following—other things equal—on a 
progressive rank-preserving transfer of income between two individuals. The next 
property of an inequality index is that of continuity (Axiom C), which demands that, for 
every positive integer n, I(x) should be continuous on Xn. The preceding four properties 
are what Shorrocks (1988) refers to as the ‘basic’ properties of an inequality index. 
These do not, of course, exhaust the set of desirable features one may look for in an 
index. One such additional desirable feature is the so-called replication invariance 
property (Axiom RI), which is the requirement that the inequality index should be 
invariant with respect to any k-fold population replication of an income distribution. 
Another such feature is captured in the scale-invariance property (Axiom SI), which 
stipulates that the inequality index be mean-independent, that is, invariant with respect 
to any uniform scaling up or down of an income distribution. The next property is a 
strengthening of the transfer axiom: transfer-sensitivity (Axiom TS—see Shorrocks and 
Foster 1987) requires that an inequality index be more responsive to income transfers at 
the lower than at the upper end of an income distribution (there are alternative ways of 
expressing this requirement, and a fuller treatment—adapted to the context of poverty 
measurement—is available in section 3.3). The next two properties are concerned with 
the relationship between subgroup inequality and overall inequality. Subgroup 
consistency ( Axiom SC)—see Shorrocks 1988—requires that, other things equal, an 
increase in any one subgroup’s inequality level should not cause overall measured 
inequality to decline. Decomposability (Axiom D) is the requirement that an inequality 
index be amenable to decomposition into two components: a within-group inequality 
component and a between-group inequality component. The final property we shall 
consider is one that can scarcely be stated in any precise or formal way. It is the 
requirement that the inequality index be amenable to ready interpretation in terms of its 
intuitive appeal. I shall call this property Axiom E, for ‘ease of interpretation’. 
We have thus far discussed certain properties of inequality indices in very general 
terms. It is time now to consider specific inequality measures.   5
2.5  Some specific inequality indices 
The literature on inequality measures differentiates between two types of measures—the 
so-called ethical measures, and the so-called descriptive measures. Ethical measures are 
those that seek to relate inequality in a distribution to the loss in social welfare arising 
from the presence of inequality: examples of this approach are to be found in the work 
of, among others, Dalton (1920), Aigner and Heins (1967), Kolm (1969), Atkinson 
(1970), and Blackorby and Donaldson (1978). For specificity, we shall briefly describe 
here the approach adopted by Atkinson (1970). Imagine that the social welfare function 
(SWF) is of the utilitarian type, and that each person has an (identical) increasing, 
strictly concave utility function, so that, given any income vector x, the SWF is given 
by: W(x) = Σ i=1
n(x)U(xi), where U(xi) defines the ith person’s utility level. Of crucial 
significance for an ethical inequality index is the notion of an equally distributed 
equivalent income, or ‘ede income’, for short. Given an income vector x, the ede income 
x
ede is defined as that level of income such that, if it is equally distributed, then the 
resulting social welfare is exactly the same as that which obtains for the distribution x. 
That is, x
ede can be obtained as the solution to the equation 
Σ i=1
n(x) U(x
ede) = Σ i=1
n(x)U(xi) (1) 
Since the U(.) function is strictly concave, x
ede will be less than the mean µ(x) of the 
distribution x. The proportionate difference between µ and x
ede then furnishes us with a 
measure of inequality, interpreted as the welfare-loss, in equivalent income units, 
occasioned by the presence of inequality.  
Atkinson specialized the individual utility function to the so-called ‘constant elasticity 
of marginal utility’ type, given by 
U(xi) = [1/(1-ε )]xi
1-ε   for  ε  > 0  and  ≠  1; 
         = logxi  for  ε  = 1  (2) 
To ensure strict concavity of U(.), ε  is confined to strictly positive values, and this 
parameter is interpreted as measuring a degree of ‘aversion’ to inequality: as ε  becomes 
larger and larger, the U function becomes more and more concave, so that the social 
welfare function W becomes more and more ‘equity-conscious’. Given (1) and (2), it is 
easy to see that, in the Atkinson context, the equally distributed equivalent income is 
given by 
x
ede = [(1/n)Σ i=1
nxi
(1-ε )]
1/(1-ε )  for  ε  > 0  and  ≠  1; 
      = exp[(1/n)Σ i=1
nlogxi]  for  ε  = 1  (3) 
Atkinson’s ‘ethical’ measure of inequality can then be written, for any given income 
vector x, as 
A(x) = [µ(x) – x
ede(x)]/µ(x) (4) 
where x
ede is as given in (3).   6
While this approach to inequality measurement is strikingly interesting, it has its own 
problems, which have been most elegantly discussed by Sen (1978). Sen points out that 
inequality indices must measure inequality, and not the loss in social welfare occasioned 
by inequality: conflating the two notions could do violence to the independent 
descriptive role which an inequality index has. 
The rest of this sub-section will be devoted to a discussion of certain widely used 
descriptive measures of inequality, which are essentially statistical measures of 
dispersion, not explicitly motivated by a desire to link inequality to the welfare losses 
arising from the former. In what follows, we present the expressions for five, fairly 
commonly used, descriptive indices. Given  any income vector  x,  the Variance of 
Incomes (V), the Variance of Log Incomes (VL), the Squared Coefficient of Variation 
(S), Theil’s (1967) ‘Entropy’ Index (T), and the Gini Coefficient of Inequality (G) are 
given, respectively, by 
V(x) = [1/n(x)]Σ i(xi – µ(x))
2 (5) 
VL(x) = [1/n(x)]Σ i(logxi – logµ(x))
2 (6) 
[Note: The version of VL presented above is the one employed by Sen (1973): the mean 
income which figures on the right hand side of (6) is the arithmetic mean rather than the 
geometric mean, which latter—strictly—is the quantity customarily employed in the 
‘varlog’ measure]. 
S(x) = [1/n(x)]Σ i[(xi – µ(x))/µ(x)]
2 = V(x)/µ
2(x) (7) 
T(x) = [1/n(x)]Σ i(xi/µ)log(xi/µ) (8) 
and 
G(x) = [n(x) + 1]/[n(x)] – [2/{n
2(x)µ(x)}]Σ i[n(x) + 1 – i]xi  (9) 
where the individuals have been indexed in non-decreasing order of their incomes, 
namely xi ≤  xi+1, i = 1,…,n – 1. 
Two major problems with the indices V and VL respectively, which tend to disqualify 
them from further serious consideration, are that the one violates Axiom SI and the 
other violates Axiom T (on the latter problem, see Sen 1973; the problem also arises 
with the ‘canonical’ version of the ‘varlog’ measure, where the mean income employed 
is the geometric mean, on which see Foster and Ok 1999). This effectively narrows 
down the field to the set of indices S, T, and G. A quick way of reviewing these three 
descriptive measures of inequality would be to consider them all together, and in 
relation to each other, in terms of the properties they satisfy. In the summary chart 
labelled Table 1, a ‘+’ stands for fulfilment of a property, and a ‘–’ stands for its 
violation. Where property E (ease of interpretation) is concerned, ‘H’ stands for ‘high’, 
‘M’ for ‘medium’, and ‘L’ for low: it must be emphasized that the evaluation according 
to this particular criterion is, inevitably, infected by the author’s subjectivism. 
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Table 1 Some descriptive inequality measures and their properties 






Gini index  
 
(G) 
Symmetry +  +  + 
Normalization +  +  + 
Transfer +  +  + 
Continuity +  +  + 
Replication invariance  +  +  + 
Scale invariance  +  +  + 
Transfer sensitivity  –  +  – 
Subgroup consistency  +  +  – 
Decomposability +  +  – 
Ease of interpretation  M  L  H 
Notes:    ‘+’: fulfilment of a given property; ‘–’: violation of the property; and ‘H’, ‘M’ and ‘L’ stand, 
respectively, for a score of ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’. 
 
The three inequality indices considered above have their respective merits and demerits. 
The squared coefficient of variation fails transfer sensitivity, unlike Theil’s T, but it 
scores a little better with respect to ease of interpretation. Theil’s index satisfies 
virtually all the desirable properties of an inequality index, except that getting an 
immediate intuitive handle on it—in terms of perceiving a transparent connection 
between the notions of inequality and entropy—is not the easiest of things (Sen 1973). 
Gini is not transfer sensitive; and it also disappointingly violates subgroup consistency 
(and therefore decomposability—see, among others, Cowell 1984). Where it does score 
high is in terms of its intuitive appeal: it lends itself to alternative, attractively neat 
interpretations—in terms of the pithy formula (conveyed forcefully to the author in 
personal communication by James Foster) of ‘the expected distance between two 
randomly drawn incomes over twice the mean’, in terms of a straightforward measure of 
dispersion (via the relative mean difference), in terms of welfare interpretations (via 
Rawls and Borda), and in terms of its link with the Lorenz curve (Gini is just twice the 
area enclosed by the Lorenz curve and the diagonal of the unit square)—which are 
reviewed in Sen (1973). Ultimately, our choice of an inequality measure must be guided 
by our larger intent and purpose. If, for instance, we are simply interested in ranking 
distributions, Gini, by virtue of the ease with which its meaning can be intuited, is a 
useful measure to employ. On the other hand, if we are interested in qualitative or 
quantitative assessments of the contributions of different subgroups to overall 
inequality, then passing the test of subgroup consistency becomes important: indeed, as 
Shorrocks (1988) has shown, the choice then gets whittled down to the class of 
inequality indices called Generalized Entropy Measures, of which the squared 
coefficient of variation and Theil’s coefficient are special cases. 
   8
2.6  Connections amongst different orderings  
It is useful, at this stage, to take stock of the ground we have covered, and to register 
any links there might be between different approaches to the problem of inequality 
measurement that we have examined. The reader will note that a good deal of what we 
have reviewed is concerned with three distinct sorts of orderings of income 
distributions: the Lorenz partial order, welfare orderings, and orderings by real-valued 
inequality indices. It is interesting to ask what connections, if any, exist between these 
types of orderings.  
It may be recalled first that at the basis of the ‘ethical approach’ to inequality 
measurement espoused by Atkinson is the postulation of an SWF given by W = Σ iU(xi), 
where the U(.) function is required to be increasing and strictly concave. There are any 
number of U(.) functions which satisfy the stated requirements. The question therefore 
arises: under what conditions can two distributions x and y sharing the same mean 
income and the same population size be ranked without particularizing any further the 
form of the U(.) function? Atkinson (1970) has presented a remarkable equivalence 
theorem which accords a central place to the Lorenz partial ordering L. What his 
theorem states is that given any two distributions x and y with the same mean income 
and population size, if xLy, then any social welfare function W = Σ iU(xi) for which the 
U(.) function is increasing and strictly concave will rank x above y; and conversely, if 
welfare from x is judged to be greater than welfare from y according to any social 
welfare function W = Σ iU(xi) for which the U(.) function is increasing and strictly 
concave, then it will be the case that xLy holds (see Fields and Fei 1978, and Foster 
1985). An additional interesting result is the following one. Let I* be the set of all real 
valued inequality indices which satisfy the properties of symmetry, normalization, 
continuity and transfer. Then the following can be asserted. Given any two distributions 
x and y with the same population sizes and mean incomes, if xLy, then we can be sure 
that I(x) < I(y) for every inequality index I that belongs to the set of indices I*. Given 
the earlier result, it also then follows that if W(x) > W(y) for any social welfare function 
W which is a sum of identical increasing and strictly concave individual utility 
functions, then I(x) < I(y) as long as the inequality index I belongs to the set of indices 
I*. More general results, involving a larger class of welfare functions through a dilution 
of the restrictions on their form, and extensions to comparisons of distributions with 
variable means and populations, are available in the literature. (The interested reader is 
referred to, among others, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1973, Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett 
1973, Sen 1973, Anand 1983, and Foster and Shorrocks1988c). 
3 Poverty  measurement 
3.1  A two-fold exercise 
Measuring poverty in the space of incomes entails a two-fold exercise, the first of which 
is identification, and the second, aggregation. Identification calls for the specification of 
a distinguished positive level of income z, called the poverty line, such that those with 
incomes less than z are certified to be poor. The word ‘those’ in the preceding line 
avoids an explicit engagement with the important issue of the appropriate unit of 
consideration when it comes to specifying the income recipient: for example, should   9
one be concerned with individuals or households? The household is a more ‘natural’ 
unit to consider, but it also raises difficult questions of how to make adjustments to the 
poverty line in order to allow for variations in household size and composition (see 
Blackwood and Lynch 1994). For specificity, we shall here assume that the income 
recipient units are individuals. Turning next to the aggregation exercise, this calls for 
combining information on the distribution of incomes and the poverty line in order to 
arrive at a real-valued index of poverty. Given our earlier definition of the set X (section 
2.3), and letting T stand for the set of positive real numbers, a poverty index is a 
mapping P: X × T →  R, such that, for every permissible combination of income vector 
x and positive poverty line z in its domain, P specifies a unique real number which is 
intended to capture the extent of poverty associated with the regime (x;z). 
3.2  Identification: absolute versus relative approaches 
Should the poverty line be pitched in an absolute or a relative sense? The answer would 
seem to depend on what one means by the term ‘relative’, as becomes clear from a 
perusal of the Sen (1983)–Townsend (1985)–Sen (1985b) exchange. If the poverty line 
is ‘relative’ in the sense of being linked to some measure of central tendency of the 
income distribution, then Sen (1983) would appear to be right in the view that the 
notions of poverty and relative inequality would no longer lend themselves to easy 
distinction. For example, if the poverty line is pegged at, say, one-half the mean income, 
then, as Sen points out, a halving of everybody’s income would leave the extent of 
measured poverty unchanged, even though some individuals could be precipitated into 
conditions of starvation. If, on the other hand, the poverty line is ‘relative’ in the sense 
of being inter-personally or inter-regionally or inter-temporally variable, to reflect 
varying resource requirements according to variable patterns of resource-needs, then 
there might be a case for admitting ‘relativity’: only, it may be more meaningful to 
characterize such an approach to conceptualizing poverty as ‘flexibly absolute’, rather 
than as ‘relative’. Indeed, as Sen has clarified, it might be most productive to view 
poverty as ‘absolute’ in the space of ‘functionings’, but ‘relative’ in the space of 
resources, commodities and incomes. (On the notions of ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ 
poverty in more general terms, a useful reference is Foster 1998). 
One distinguished strand of the ‘absolute’ approach is the so-called ‘biological’ (see Sen 
1981) conceptualization: here, the poverty line is identified in terms of the income 
needed to achieve a nutritionally adequate diet. There has been very considerable 
controversy on what constitutes—in terms of calories, say—a nutritionally adequate 
diet: both inter- and intra-individual variations in requirements have been postulated, 
with accompanying theories of ‘adjustment’ and ‘adaptation’ (see, in particular, 
Sukhatme 1978, 1981, 1982, Sukhatme and Margen 1980, and Seckler 1982). For a 
sorting out of the difficult issues involved, the reader is referred to Osmani (1992), and 
Dasgupta and Ray (1990). 
Even when ‘relativity’ is interpreted in its ‘flexibly absolute’ sense, the identification 
exercise could present potential problems, of both a conceptual and a practical nature, in 
undertaking inter-temporal and cross-section poverty comparisons. Specifically: are 
poverty comparisons meaningful only when the same poverty line is employed across 
the board? If so, how is this view compatible with the notion that poverty in different 
regions (or at different points in time for the same region) should be assessed in terms of 
standards that are appropriate for these different regions (or different points in time)?   10
These questions acquire a particular salience in the context of cross-country poverty 
comparisons (see, for example, Blackwood and Lynch 1994). The difficulty may well 
reside in, precisely, taking an ‘either/or’ view of the problem, and it is useful, in this 
context, to quote Sen (1981a: 21) at some length: 
There is … nothing contradictory in asserting both of the following pair 
of statements: 
(1) There is less deprivation in community A than in community B in 
terms of some common standard, e.g. the notions of minimum 
needs prevailing in community A. 
(2) There is more deprivation in community A than in community B 
in terms of their respective standards of minimum needs, which 
are a good deal higher in A than in B. 
It is rather pointless to dispute which of these two senses is the ‘correct’ 
one, since it is quite clear that both types of questions are of interest. The 
important thing to note is that the two questions are quite distinct from 
each other. 
Briefly, then, there is no uncomplicated or non-controversial route to the identification 
problem; but assuming that it has, somehow, been solved (usually by appeal to some 
consensual agreement around a ‘reasonable’ norm), the next step in poverty 
measurement would be constituted by the aggregation exercise, to which we now turn. 
3.3  Aggregation: properties of poverty indices 
As in the case of inequality measurement, we consider in what follows a set of 
properties of poverty indices on which the literature has produced a fair measure of 
agreement as to their appeal. First, the focus axiom (Axiom F), stipulates that the extent 
of measured poverty should, other things equal, be invariant with respect to increases in 
non-poor incomes. A focussed income-poverty measure, therefore, reckons well-being 
in terms of the condition of the poor, and not—unlike other income-based indicators of 
aggregate well-being—in terms of the population as a whole. Second, symmetry 
(Axiom S) demands that interpersonal permutations of incomes among the population 
should leave the value of the poverty index unchanged. Third, normalization (Axiom N) 
requires that, for any (x;z)∈ X × T, if xi ≥  z for all i, then P(x;z) = 0 (that is, if nobody is 
poor, the extent of poverty is taken to be zero). Fourth, continuity (Axiom C) is the 
property that the poverty index P should be continuous on the set of sub-vectors of poor 
incomes.  Monotonicity ( Axiom M) demands that, ceteris paribus, poverty should 
increase with a decline in any poor person’s income. Transfer (Axiom T) is the property 
that, other things remaining the same, a progressive rank-preserving income transfer 
between two poor individuals should cause poverty to decline. Transfer sensitivity 
requires the poverty index to be more responsive to income transfers at the lower than at 
the upper end of the distribution of poor incomes. There are at least two ways of 
capturing this requirement (see Kakwani 1984, and Foster 1984). The first—call this 
property  transfer sensitivity-1 ( Axiom TS-1)—says that a given progressive rank-
preserving transfer between two poor individuals separated by a given number of 
individuals should cause poverty to decline by more the poorer the pair of individuals   11
involved in the transfer. The second—call this property transfer sensitivity-2 (Axiom  
TS-2)—says that a given progressive rank-preserving transfer between two poor 
individuals separated by a given income should cause poverty to decline by more the 
poorer the pair of individuals involved in the transfer. Next, a couple of invariance 
properties: replication invariance (Axiom RI) demands that, for all x,y∈ X and z∈ T,  
if y = (x,…,x) and n(y) = kn(x), where k is any positive integer, then P(x;z) = P(y;z); 
and scale invariance (Axiom SI) demands that, for all (x;z)∈ X × T, P(x;z) = P(ρ x;ρ z) 
where  ρ  is any positive scalar. Subgroup consistency ( Axiom SC—see Foster and 
Shorrocks 1991) is the property that poverty should increase with an increase in any 
subgroup’s poverty, other things remaining the same. Decomposability (Axiom D) is a 
strengthened version of subgroup consistency: it requires the poverty index to be 
expressible as a weighted sum of subgroup poverty levels, the weights being the 
relevant subgroup population shares (see Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984). Finally, 
as in the case of inequality measurement, one could have an axiom of ready 
comprehensibility, or ease of interpretation (Axiom E). 
The stock of desirable properties can certainly be expanded, but the more important of 
them have been covered in the preceding inventory. Clearly, not all poverty indices 
satisfy all of the axioms listed; and, on occasion, the quest for poverty indices satisfying 
specified sets of properties could end in the discovery of non-existence (for some 
impossibility theorems on poverty measures, see, among others, the articles by Kundu 
and Smith 1983, Donaldson and Weymark 1986, and Subramanian 2002). As in the case 
of inequality indices, so in the case of poverty measures, the choice of index must be 
guided by the appeal of the underlying axiom structure in relation to intent, motivation, 
purpose, and the availability of data. (For instance, when detailed data on income 
distributions are unavailable, and all we have are binary classifications of the population 
into the ‘poor’ and the ‘nonpoor’, then poverty comparisons in terms of even a ‘partial’ 
index—to use the terminology of Foster and Sen 1997—such as the headcount ratio are 
better than no comparisons: there is a case for not making the infeasibly comprehensive 
the enemy of the feasibly partial.) We turn now to a consideration of some of the more 
widely-known real-valued indices of poverty that have been advanced in the literature. 
3.4  Aggregation: some specific poverty indices 
All of the poverty indices reviewed in this section are defined on the domain X × T, that 
is, for every permissible combination of income distribution x and poverty line z: the 
arguments x and z of the poverty index will simply be taken as read in much of what 
follows. For every combination of x and z, Q(x;z) will stand for the set of all poor 
individuals whose incomes are represented in the vector x, and q(x;z) will stand for the 
cardinality of Q(x;z). 
The most commonly used index of poverty is the so-called headcount ratio, H, which 
simply measures the proportion of the poor population in total population. The income-
gap ratio, Y, measures the proportionate shortfall of the average income of the poor,  
µ
P  ≡  (1/q)Σ i∈ Qxi, from the poverty line z. The product of H and Y, denoted by R, 
expresses the income-gap ratio in per person terms: R is the per capita income-gap 
ratio. The principal virtue of indices like H and Y is that they satisfy Axiom E: the 
underlying meaning of both is very easy to grasp. A well-known problem with H is that 
it violates monotonicity; and while Y and R respect monotonicity, neither satisfies the 
transfer property. Sen (1976) sought to remedy this deficiency by pursuing an axiomatic   12
approach to the construction of a ‘distribution-sensitive’ ordinal poverty index, PS, 
expressed as a normalized weighted sum of the income-gap ratios of the poor, the 
weights being the respective rank-orders in the sub-vector of poor incomes: 
PS = [2/(q + 1)nz]Σ i∈ Q(z – xi)(q + 1 – i)  (10) 
where the poor individuals have been ranked in non-decreasing order of their incomes, 
namely, xi ≤  xi+1 for all i∈ Q\{q}. 
Given the rank-order weighting system employed in the expression for PS, it should not 
be surprising if the Gini index of inequality had a role to play in the poverty index. 
Indeed, it turns out that, for ‘large’ values of q, the Sen index can be asymptotically 
approximated to the following expression: 
PS = H[Y + (1 – Y)G
P] (10′) 
where G
P is the Gini coefficient of inequality in the distribution of poor incomes. By 
combining information on the incidence, the depth, and the ‘severity’ of poverty, the 
Sen index furnishes a more comprehensive account of poverty than any of H, Y, or R: in 
particular, PS satisfies both the monotonicity and transfer axioms. Among early critiques 
and modifications of the Sen index are those by Takayama (1979) and Thon (1979). 
Takayama proposed a variant of the Sen index, involving the use of a ‘censored’ income 
distribution, which, unfortunately fails the monotonicity test. While the Sen index 
penalizes any regressive transfer among the poor which leaves the beneficiary of the 
transfer poor, it does not invariably punish a regressive transfer which enables the 
beneficiary to escape poverty. If this is seen as a shortcoming, then a way of rectifying it 
is to employ a weighting system on the right hand side of (10) wherein the relevant 
weight is the rank-order in the entire income vector rather than in the sub-vector of poor 
incomes; and this leads to Thon’s variant of the Sen index (see also Shorrocks 1995). 
Kakwani (1980b) sought a parametric generalization of Sen’s index, in a bid to meet the 
requirement of Axiom TS-1, which the Sen index fails. 
A distinguished class of poverty indices—in which the Sen index and its variants are not 
included—is that constituted by the additively separable indices (see Atkinson 1987, 
Foster and Shorrocks 1991, and Keen 1992). Here, resort is had to a set of individual 
deprivation functions φ (xi;z), with the property that φ (xi;z) > 0 for xi < z, and φ (xi;z) = 0 
for xi ≥  z.; and a poverty index P is additively separable if it can be written as a simple 
average of these deprivation functions, viz. for all (x;z)∈ X × T: 
P(x;z) = (1/n)Σ i∈ Qφ (xi;z) (11) 
Many of the properties of poverty indices discussed earlier are implied, in the context of 
additively separable measures, by restrictions on the individual deprivation functions. 
Given a deprivation function φ (x;z), if φ  is a continuous function of x∈ [0,z), then P is 
continuous; if φ  is a declining function of x in the range [0,z), then P satisfies 
monotonicity; and if, additionally, φ  is a strictly declining and convex function of x for 
all x∈ [0,z), then P satisfies the transfer axiom. A number of poverty indices advanced in 
the literature are different specializations of the function φ (x;z). The more salient of 
these indices are quickly reviewed in what follows.   13
For xi <  z ,  i f  w e  s e t  φ (xi;z) = loge(z/xi) in (11), we obtain Watts’ (1968) poverty   
index PW; if φ (xi;z) = (1/β )[1 – (xi/z)
β ], β  < 1, we obtain the Clark, Hemming, and  
Ulph (1981) class of indices PCHU(β ); if φ (xi;z) = 1 – (xi/z)
σ , σ∈ (0,1), we obtain the 
Chakravarty (1983) set of indices PC(σ ); if φ (xi;z) = (1 – xi/z)
α ,  α  ≥   0, we obtain   
the Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) Pα  family of indices; and corresponding to  
φ (xi;z) = e
γ (1-xi
/z) – 1, γ  > 0, we obtain Zheng’s (2000) group of ‘constant distribution-
sensitivity’ indices PZ(γ ). 
All of the above indices (or families of indices) satisfy Axioms F, SI, RI, and D (and 
therefore, SC). Watts’ index satisfies Axioms M, T, and TS-2 as well. For the other 
families of indices, Axioms M, T, and TS-2 are satisfied for parameter values of β , δ , α , 
and γ  which are lesser or greater than specified cut-off values for the fulfilment of the 
respective axioms. (For example, the Pα  indices all satisfy focus, and scale- and 
replication-invariance, for α  ≥  0; monotonicity for α  > 0; transfer for α  > 1; and TS-2 
for α  > 2.) A major feature of all these indices is that they are decomposable—unlike 
the Sen index which fails even the weaker condition of subgroup consistency. 
Finally, mention must be made of the so-called ‘ethical’ indices of poverty—see, among 
others, Blackorby and Donaldson (1980) and Hagenaars (1987)—which are similar in 
motivation to the Atkinson-type ‘ethical’ indices of inequality we have encountered 
earlier. Here, the idea is to express the poverty index as a distinguished per capita 
income-gap ratio R* = HY*, where Y* is the proportionate shortfall from the poverty 
line of Atkinson’s ‘equally distributed equivalent income’ xP
ede—computed for the 
distribution of poor incomes. Depending on which particular underlying ‘social 
evaluation function’ is favoured, one can obtain different expressions for xP
ede, and 
therefore—via Y*—for the ethical poverty index R*. 
3.5  Plurality and ranking 
Plurality can interfere with the possibility of unambiguous poverty rankings in at least 
two ways. First, there may be a range of plausible poverty lines, rather than a unique 
line, to consider, and it could happen that a given poverty index measures more poverty 
in distribution x than in distribution y for one poverty line z1, but measures more 
poverty in y than in x for some other poverty line z2, where both z1 and z2 belong to the 
plausible range of poverty lines. Second, with more than one poverty index figuring in 
the analyst’s menu, it is possible, given a poverty line z, that one index pronounces that 
x has more poverty than y, while another index pronounces that y has more poverty than 
x. Foster and Shorrocks (1988c) and Zheng (2000), among others, have investigated the 
first problem, while treatments of the second problem can be found in Foster (1984), 
Atkinson (1987), Foster and Shorrocks (1988a, 1988b), Shorrocks (1995), Spencer and 
Fisher (1992), Foster and Sen (1997), and Zheng (2000). Here we will simply note, very 
quickly, that the prospect of obtaining unambiguous poverty rankings, in respect of both 
categories of problems outlined, is linked to the fulfilment of various stochastic 
dominance, ‘generalized Lorenz’ dominance, ‘poverty profile’ dominance, and 
‘generalized poverty profile’ dominance, conditions. A generic problem for poverty 
measurement, using the difficulty presented for unambiguous ranking by a multiplicity 
of poverty indices as an example, is the following. It is true that the probability that the 
sorts of ‘dominance conditions’ we have mentioned will be satisfied increases as we 
restrict the set of poverty indices in contention through restrictions on their properties   14
(such as on ‘distribution sensitivity’, as in Zheng 2000); but even as the uncertainty  
of obtaining consensus on rankings declines, the uncertainty regarding the ‘rightness’ of 
the poverty indices retained presumably increases, as one constricts the set of 
admissible indices. The problem has a certain analogy with the conduct of an election. If 
a movement toward unanimity is preferred, then a means to that end would be to 
confine voting rights to a smaller and smaller set of ‘like-minded’ voters—until, in the 
limit, all ambiguity is eliminated, assuming no ambiguity is attached to the desirability 
of just one vote counting, through straightforward dictatorship! Briefly, the poverty 
analyst must always contend with the problem that while plurality can promote 
ambiguity in one sense, singularity can promote ambiguity in another sense. There is no 
simple golden rule for the ‘right’ choice of the range of poverty indices and poverty 
lines that could be employed in poverty analysis. 
3.6  Poverty indices and anti-poverty policy 
Direct income transfers to the poor, and wage employment schemes, are two 
instruments for combating poverty. Given a budget of fixed size, what is an optimal 
pattern of income allocation to the poor, or an optimal wage, depending on which 
instrument is wielded? The answers would typically depend on how poverty (which is 
the quantity being sought to be minimized) is measured. Bourguignon and Fields (1990) 
and Gangopadhyay and Subramanian (1992) address the income transfer problem. For 
specificity, one could measure poverty by the Pα  class of indices. It turns out that for  
α  < 1, the prescribed optimal allocation is one in which only the richest of the poor, 
close to the poverty line, are the beneficiaries; for α  = 1, the odd outcome is that any 
feasible transfer schedule which exhausts the budget is also optimal; and for α  > 1, one 
has a ‘lexicographic maximin solution’, whereby, through a sequence of progressive 
and income-equalizing transfers, the poorest of the poor are raised to that level of 
income which is compatible with exhausting the budget. In the matter of wage 
employment programmes (see, among others, Basu 1981, Dreze and Sen 1989, 
Ravallion 1991, and Gangopadhyay and Subramanian 1992), for α  = 0, the optimal 
wage is the poverty line income z; and as α  increases, the optimal wage declines and 
coverage increases until, in the limit, for α  tending to infinity, the wage is pitched as 
low as is compatible with creating the maximum number of jobs for which there are 
takers, given the size of the budget. The nature of the solution, in each case—with 
specific reference to the question of ‘distribution-sensitivity’—is a comment on, and 
serves to clarify our intuitive grasp of, the poverty index employed. 
It should also be clear from the above that in all but the last case (poverty minimization 
through wage employment in the ‘α  tending to infinity’ setting, which is compatible 
with the phenomenon of ‘self-selection’), the intended beneficiaries of the poverty 
redress scheme would have to be identified and targeted, through (presumably 
costly)’means testing’. This raises questions pertaining to the relative merits of 
‘universal provisioning’ and means-testing (Besley 1990); the principles of targeting 
(Besley and Kanbur 1993); and the possibilities of ‘imperfect targeting’ in a variety of 
contexts (Kanbur 1987, Besley and Kanbur 1988, Ravallion and Chao 1989), all of 
which issues lend themselves to being addressed as part of the analytics of poverty 
measurement.   15
3.7  Some other issues in poverty measurement 
Research in poverty measurement has made many advances, and clarified many sources 
of conceptual confusion, since the early systematic efforts initiated by Watts (1968) and 
Sen (1976). There are still many issues which require more sustained investigation. 
Simply by way of allusion, some of these issues are mentioned here. Fuzzy approaches 
to the measurement of poverty have been considered by, among others, Shorrocks and 
Subramanian (1994) and Martinetti (2000). (Indeed, inequality measurement is also 
open to a fuzzy approach, for two examples of which see Basu 1989, and Ok 1995.) The 
aggregation of deprivation assessed multi-dimensionally presents certain difficulties, for 
treatments of which the reader is referred to Mukherjee (2001) and Tsui (2002). A 
completely different variety of problem, revolving around the ‘adjustment’ of poverty 
indices for premature excess mortality among the poor, is considered by Kanbur and 
Mukherjee (2002): the larger issue revolves around the ethical and logical sustainability 
of divorcing the outcome of poverty changes from the processes leading to these 
changes. Yet another problem arises from the competing claims of the aggregate 
headcount A and the headcount ratio H as the appropriate means of factoring the 
incidence of poverty into a poverty index: two accounts of the nature and implications 
of the conflict are available in Chakravarty, Kanbur, and Mukherjee (2002) and 
Subramanian (2002). These, and other problems, may not be amenable to completely 
satisfactory ‘solutions’, but an identification and elaboration of these problems is 
arguably itself of some instructional value. 
4  Inequality and poverty: links and disjunctions 
The inter-connections between poverty and inequality are apparent in a number of ways. 
For one thing, and as we have seen, for the entire set of ‘distribution-sensitive’ poverty 
indices (namely, those which satisfy the transfer axiom), an increase in inequality in the 
distribution of poor incomes will, ceteris paribus, cause measured poverty to rise. For 
another, letting x
P
z stand for the vector of poor incomes given any income vector x and 
poverty line z, it would be the case that, for all equidimensional x,y∈ X and z∈ R, if  




z, and xLy, then P(x;z) < P(y;z) for any poverty index 
P which belongs to the class P* of indices which are focused, monotonic, transfer-
preferring and scale-invariant; while if the Lorenz curves of x  and  y  coincide,  
q(x;z) = q(y;z), and µ(x) > µ(y), then again P(x;z) < P(y;z) for any poverty index P∈ P*. 
These considerations have led some analysts (Kakwani and Subbarao 1990 and Datt and 
Ravallion 1992) to seek to ‘decompose’ a poverty change into a ‘growth’ component 
(attributable to a change in mean income, holding the Lorenz curve fixed) and an 
‘inequality’ component (attributable to a change in the distributional parameters of the 
Lorenz curve, holding the mean income fixed). These are instances of ‘congruence’ 
between poverty and inequality. 
But there are clearly also cases of conflict. We have noted earlier that certain poverty 
indices (like Sen’s) do not invariably register an increase following on a regressive 
income transfer between two poor individuals when the beneficiary is thereby enabled 
to cross the poverty line. This has led some commentators like Pyatt (1987) to 
characterize Sen-type indices as being ‘badly behaved’. The underlying presumption 
seems to be that the SWF should be of the standard ‘two objective’ type, increasing in 
mean income and declining in inequality, so that a ‘three objective’ SWF, with poverty   16
also explicitly factored into it, is effectively reduced to what Brent (1986: 93) calls ‘the 
two objective version in disguise’. (For a number of other treatments of the subject of 
poverty, inequality and social welfare, the reader is referred to Hagenaars 1987, 
Vaughan 1987, and Lewis and Ulph 1988). However, Brent (op. cit.) has demonstrated 
plausible conditions under which a well-defined, ‘equity-conscious’ SWF can actually 
register an increase with an increase in the headcount ratio of poverty: an SWF which 
favours equality could be inimical to poverty-reduction. The ‘bad behaviour’ of poverty 
indices, then, is attributable to a notion that cannot simply be dismissed out of hand: 
namely, that the poverty line is a distinguished dividing line, such that the ability to 
cross it is invested with a special welfare significance. Furthermore, in situations 
wherein the mean income is less than the poverty line, poverty-minimization may call 
for a ‘man overboard’ solution to the ‘lifeboat dilemma’: equalizing incomes across the 
board could leave the entire population in very straitened circumstances, whereas 
allocating no income to a subset of the population while permitting the rest to be raised 
to the poverty line level of income might prove to be a harsh but pragmatic necessity 
(see Dasgupta and Ray 1986 and Subramanian 1989). 
Briefly, then, while there are clearly many congruent linkages between poverty and 
inequality, the conflicts between the two must also be recognized: there may be no 
particular virtue to insisting on a view of social welfare in which welfare increases 
through inequality-reduction must necessarily always be accompanied by reductions 
also in poverty. Poverty and inequality are related, but distinct concepts. 
5  Deprivation and disparity: towards a more inclusive approach 
5.1 Income  alone? 
Are poverty and inequality assessed in the space solely of incomes sufficient to convey 
a picture of how well or badly a society is doing? Is an ‘adequate’ level of personal 
disposable income a sufficient guarantor of achievement in the dimensions of, say, 
literacy, nutrition, longevity and health? Inter- and intra-country comparisons do not 
invariably furnish an affirmative answer to these questions. Thus, for example, 
relatively income-poor countries like China or Ecuador or Costa Rica have relatively 
impressive records in dimensions of well-being such as literacy, life expectancy and 
health, while relatively income-rich countries like some of the Arab States display 
relatively poor performances in extra-income aspects of well-being. Similarly, the 
Indian state of Kerala is way ahead of a relatively (income-wise) richer state like 
Haryana when it comes to assessing well-being in dimensions such as fertility, 
expectation of life at birth, infant mortality, and literacy. These empirical findings 
suggest strongly the importance of going beyond the metric of income in assessing 
deprivation, disparity, and well-being. 
5.2 Well-being  beyond  income 
Much of our preceding review of the measurement of inequality and poverty has been 
related to a somewhat special and narrow conception of well-being. ‘Well-being’, in this 
view, has been largely conflated with ‘welfare’, which itself has generally been seen to 
be some aggregation of individual ‘utilities’, with a person’s utility being taken to   17
depend just on their income. In Sen (1980), and a host of related writings, we see the 
beginnings of a substantive engagement with the question ‘equality of what?’ 
Depending on what particular view of well-being we may be disposed to favour, we 
may choose to assess deprivation and disparity in the dimensions of income, or 
resources generally, or utilities, or, as in Rawls (1971), ‘primary goods’. Sen himself 
(1985) advances the view that the most relevant engagement with the notion of well-
being obtains when one’s concern is with human capability. Deprivation, in this 
reckoning, is fruitfully seen as a failure of capability; and the containment of disparity is 
reflected in moving towards equality in the space of capabilities. The capability in 
question is not an abstract capability, but the capability to function—a functioning being 
what Sen calls ‘a state of being or doing’. In this expanded view of well-being, a 
concern with income (and therefore with measures of income-poverty and inequality as 
indicators of ‘ill-being’) is not invalidated; what is, however, called into question is an 
exclusive preoccupation with income-related indicators—which can result in a picture of 
development which is both partial and misleading. A more inclusive view of well-being 
such as is afforded by the capability approach underlines the need for data on, and 
measurement of, indicators that go beyond the income metric (Qizilbash 1996, 1997). 
5.3 Generalized well-being/deprivation indicators 
As part of the more expansive view of well-being which is dictated by the sorts of 
considerations just reviewed, there has been an increasing concentration of effort among 
scholars to derive and justify measures of human well-being and capability deprivations 
that transcend an exclusive concern with the space of incomes. Among salient 
contributions to this effort—with, naturally, differences in content and emphasis—are 
the ‘basic needs’ approach to reckoning achievement (Hicks and Streeten 1979); the 
concern with assessing the ‘quality of life’ (Morriss 1979, Sen 1981b); the importance 
attached to individuals’ ‘capability to function’ (Sen 1985a, Sen et al. 1987); and the 
primacy accorded to the evaluation of ‘human development’ (UNDP 1990-2002, 
McGillivray 1991, McGillivray and White 1993). 
The Human Development Index (HDI) has, through successive annual compilations of 
its country-wise values by the United Nations Development Programme’s Human 
Development Reports (or UNDP’s HDRs, for short), become a widely-known shorthand 
measure of aggregate well-being. This is the subject of an entirely separate paper in the 
UNU-WIDER Social Development Indicators project and will therefore not be dealt 
with here. Additionally, the emphasis in this essay is on deprivation, as such: the HDI 
reckons the well-being of any given population by reference to the population as a 
whole, whereas, from a poverty perspective, there would be a case for measuring well-
being with specific reference to the condition only of the deprived section of the 
population. (This would correspond to the distinction between (a) a focussed income-
poverty measure and (b) other income-based measures of aggregate well-being of the 
population considered in its entirety.) Driven by this motivation, a number of measures 
of deprivation, seen in the light of capability failure, have been developed: these would 
include the ‘Capability Poverty Measure’ in UNDP’s HDR 1996; the ‘Human Poverty 
Index’ in UNDP’s HDR 1997; Mahbub ul Haq’s (1997) ‘Human Deprivation Measure’; 
and Majumdar and Subramanian’s (2001) ‘Capability Failure Ratio’. In the interests of 
specificity, and also because it is the most comprehensive deprivation measure among 
the indices just mentioned, it is the Human Poverty Index (HPI) which will be the focus 
of attention here.   18
5.4  The Human Poverty Index 
The HPI is a multi-dimensional index. It measures deprivation in three dimensions—
those of longevity, knowledge, and standard of living, and thus achieves a certain 
correspondence with the components of the HDI, with the difference that there is no 
specifically income component in the HPI. The HPI can be written as a combination of 
distinguished headcount ratios of failure in selected dimensions of the capability to 
function. Specifically, let Π 1 be the proportion of the population which is expected not 
to survive to the age of 40; let Π 2 be the adult illiteracy rate; and let Π 3 be a composite 
of the proportion of the population without access to health services and to safe water, 
and the proportion of the under-5 population which is under-nourished. Then, Π 1, Π 2, 
and Π 3 are measures of capability failure in the dimensions, respectively, of longevity, 
knowledge and standard of living. The HPI can be written—for a detailed treatment the 
reader is referred to ‘Technical Note 1. Properties of the human poverty index’ in 
UNDP’s HDR 1997—in its most general form, as a weighted average of order η , Π (η ), 
which is given by 
Π (η ) = [(w1Π 1
η  + w2Π 2
η  +
 w3Π 3
η )/(w1 + w2+ w3)]
1/η  (12) 
where wk > 0 (k = 1,2,3) is a weight attached to the headcount ratio of human   
poverty in the kth dimension, and η   ≥  1 is an indicator of the extent of   
‘substitutability’ between the components of the HPI (with a higher value of η  
reflecting a lower degree of substitutability: for η  = 1, we have perfect substitutability, 
and as η  becomes indefinitely large we move toward zero substitutability, so that 
limη→∞ Π (η ) = max{Π 1,Π 2,Π 3}). 
Certain distinguished members of the Π (η ) class of indices, obtained for specified 
values of η  and specified patterns of the weighting structure {wk}, are presented below: 
Π *(η ) = [(Π 1




1/η , η  ≥  1  (13) 
Π *(η ) is the ordinary mean of order η , obtained by setting w1 = w2 = w3. 
Π (1) = [(w1Π 1 + w2Π 2
 +
 w3Π 3)/(w1 + w2 + w3)] (14) 
Π (1) is the weighted mean of order 1, or weighted arithmetic mean, obtained by setting 
η  = 1. 
Π *(1) = (Π 1 + Π 2
 +
 Π 3)/3 (15) 
Π *(1) is the simple arithmetic mean of Π 1, Π 2, and Π 3, obtained by setting η  = 1 and  
w1 = w2 = w3 = 1. It may be noted that the measure Π *(1) is decomposable. That is to 
say, if the population is partitioned into M mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
subgroups; if Π mk is the headcount ratio of deprivation for the mth group (m = 1,…,M) 
in the kth dimension (k = 1,2,3); if Π m*(1) = (Π m1 + Π m2 + Π m3)/3 is the simple 
arithmetic mean version of the HPI for group m (m = 1,…,M); and if tm is the 
population share of group m (m = 1,…,M): then, it is true that 
Π *(1) = Σ m=1
MtmΠ m*(1) (16)   19
Finally, the HPI, as it is computed in HDR 1997, is obtained by setting η  = 3 and  
w1 = w2 = w3: the resulting measure, Π *(3), is written as 
Π *(3) = [(Π 1





Does a multi-dimensional human poverty index convey the same information as a uni-
dimensional income-based poverty index? This, of course, in an empirical question, and 
the answer would depend on the precise indices one uses, the particular poverty norms 
one adopts, and the units of observation one considers in performing the comparison 
exercise. In this connection, some of the cross-country findings reported in UNDP’s 
HDR 1997 are instructive. Employing 1993 data for a set of 36 countries on the HPI 
Π *(3) of (5.4.6) and on the income-based headcount ratio of poverty (call it H) obtained 
by employing a poverty line of a dollar a day (in 1985 purchasing power parity dollars), 
the  HDR (1997: 22) states that ‘regression analysis indicates a weak relationship 
between the headcount index of income poverty and HPI…’. For a subset of 41 
countries for which data on both HPI (as measured by Π *(3)) and H are available in 
HDR 1997, it turns out that the coefficient of rank correlation between an ordering of 
countries by HPI and an ordering by H is fairly strong (Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient is of the order of 0.82), but not perfect. These results suggest, at the least, 
that income-based measures of poverty are not necessarily completely adequate 
surrogates for a more expansive, capability-oriented reckoning of disparity. 
Additionally, the experiences of countries such as China, Costa Rica, Kenya, Peru, the 
Philippines, and Zimbabwe—see HDR 1997—which have displayed greater success in 
reducing human poverty than income-poverty point to the possibilities of enhancing 
achievements in the space of human functionings by routes different from those centred 
exclusively on income-growth and the percolation of that growth to the poor. In 
particular, these experiences would stress the importance of state intervention in 
securing relief from human poverty—an emphasis which is at some variance with a 
view, which is increasingly gaining currency in some quarters, that somewhat sidelines 
the state in favour of the market and civil society as agents for the promotion of 
aggregate well-being. 
It remains now to consider how, given a deprivation index which, like Π *(1) in (15), is 
decomposable (even if not multi-dimensional), one may assess the extent of group-
related disparity in the distribution of that deprivation. 
5.5 Reckoning  inter-group  disparities  in the distribution of deprivation 
A decomposable real-valued index of generalized deprivation—call it D—is really a 
measure of central tendency: it presents the aggregate deprivation in a society, averaged 
over the deprivations of specific groups constituting the society. That is, suppose the 
population is partitioned into M mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive groups, 
identified by the running index m = 1,…,M; then, if Dm is the deprivation level of the 
mth group (and it will be assumed that the groups are arranged in non-increasing order 
of deprivation, so that Dm ≥  Dm+1, m = 1,…,M – 1), and if tm is the population share of 
the mth group, D can be written as: D = Σ m=1
MtmDm. For future use, let us also define Tm 
to be the cumulate proportion of the population with deprivation levels not exceeding 
that of the mth group, for every group m = 1,…,M. D, being a simple average of group-
specific deprivation levels, conceals any inequality there may be in the inter-group 
distribution of deprivations. Such group-related disparity is clearly an important datum   20
in assessing aggregate well-being, and there is therefore a strong case for reckoning 
such disparity in the measurement of deprivation (see Stewart 2001). To this end, one 
can construct ‘adjusted’ measures of deprivation, where the adjustment takes the form 
of buttressing information on the average level of deprivation with information on the 
inter-group disparity of its distribution. Two such adjusted measures, D* and D**, are 
presented below. 
D*(λ ) = [Σ m=1
MtmDm
λ ]
1/λ , λ∈ [1,∞ ) (18) 
and 
D**(δ ) = [1/(M-1)]Σ m=1
M[(M-1-δ m)tm + δ Tm]Dm, δ∈ [0,1] (19) 
λ  and δ  in (18) and (19) respectively are parameters of ‘inter-group disparity aversion’, 
with the extent of aversion being an increasing function of the values of the parameters. 
Consider the special case in which M = 2 (where, for example, the population has been 
partitioned into ‘males’ and ‘females’). For λ  = 1 [respectively, δ  = 0], D* [respectively, 
D**] just collapses to D: this the ‘(average) Benthamite’ rule of reckoning aggregate 
deprivation simply in terms of the average level of deprivation; for λ  →  ∞  [respectively, 
δ  = 1], D* [respectively, D**] just collapses to D1: this is the ‘Rawlsian’ rule of 
reckoning aggregate deprivation in terms of the deprivation of the worst-off group. In 
general, each of D* and D** is amenable to being expressed as the average level of 
deprivation D enhanced by a factor incorporating a measure of between-group 
inequality: as it happens, this inequality measure, in the case of D*, is an Atkinson-type 
‘ethical’ index of inter-group disparity and, in the case of D**, a Gini-type ‘descriptive’ 
measure. D* is essentially an adaptation of a procedure advanced by Anand and Sen 
(1995), and subsequently adopted by the UNDP’s Human Development Reports, for 
constructing a ‘gender-adjusted HDI’; and D**—see Subramanian and Majumdar 
2002—is a generalization of what Majumdar and Subramanian (2001) call an ‘adjusted 
capability failure ratio’, which the authors have computed, in an application to Indian 
data, for a partitioning of the population according to gender, caste and sector of 
residence. For a version of the ‘adjusted capability ratio’, as applied to an assessment of 
disparity in the cross-country distribution of deprivation, the reader is referred to 
Subramanian (2003). 
5.6  Expanding the interpretation of well-being: orientation, policy and data 
By taking a more expansive view of well-being than is afforded by a wholly income-
centred approach, we have seen that the measurement emphasis also shifts from an 
exclusive concern with indicators of poverty and inequality to more general indicators 
of deprivation and disparity. From many perspectives, this is a welcome shift. For one 
thing, data on income or consumption expenditure, which are required for constructing 
indices of poverty and inequality, are not always wholly reliable. Inter-temporal 
comparisons of poverty and inequality, based on sample surveys, are often vitiated by 
changes in concepts, definitions, and reference periods of recall. Additionally, the 
identification problem is notoriously difficult to solve, and eliciting consensus on a 
poverty line is frequently a vexed business, which is customarily disposed of through a 
stance of philosophical resignation to the inevitability of some measure of arbitrariness 
and subjectivism in the measurement exercise. Further, there is always room for 
(endless) controversies on the ‘correct’ choice of price deflators with which to update   21
base-year poverty lines so that these may be expressed in current prices. All of these 
problems are amply reflected in, for example, the Indian literature on poverty. Despite 
insistence on an ‘ordinally pure’ interpretation of poverty indices, few would really 
agree that there is no difference between a decline, over a forty-year period, in the 
headcount ratio from 50 per cent to 30 per cent according to one set of poverty norms 
and a decline, over the same period, from 70 per cent to 65 per cent according to 
another set of norms. For all of these reasons, there is a strong case for being guided by 
generalized indicators of deprivation and disparity rather than solely by indictors of 
poverty and inequality. By focusing directly on the capability to function, in addition to 
reckoning income-based indicators, one can get a fuller picture of time-series and cross-
section variations in well-being deprivations and disparities. This would call for the 
compilation, by official data-generating agencies, and the use, by policy-makers and 
researchers, of data which are richer and more extensive than a narrow preoccupation 
with income will allow. Indeed, both national and international agencies are 
increasingly turning to the compilation and use of data sets on achievements with 
respect to literacy, health, nutrition, longevity, fertility, and the like. From the points of 
view of both social explanation and collective redress, it is fruitful to address problems 
of—for example—child labour, women’s well-being, demographic transition, and social 
exclusion, by paying attention not only to achievements in the income dimension but to 
achievements in, say, the provision of potable water, sanitation, energy for cooking, 
electricity, public health care, and roads. Hence the catholic approach to measurement, 
in this paper and in this research project. 
6 Concluding  observations 
In this paper, an attempt has been made to cover, however quickly, certain crucial issues 
in the measurement of economic poverty and inequality, as well as more generalized 
deprivation and disparity. We have discussed Lorenz orderings, welfare orderings, and 
inequality orderings; we have examined the welfare bases of inequality comparisons; 
we have presented axioms for both inequality and poverty measurement; we have 
reviewed a number of both the so-called ‘ethical’ and descriptive measures of inequality 
and poverty; we have attempted to evaluate these indices, and to take stock of the 
importance of being guided by motive and purpose in their choice for concrete 
applications; we have pointed to sources of ambiguity in the measurement of the 
phenomena under investigation; we have attempted to locate anti-poverty policy in the 
context of measurement issues; we have sought to elucidate the relationship between 
inequality and poverty within an overall framework of welfare; and we have presented a 
rationale for, and discussed measurement issues relating to, the assessment of 
deprivation and disparity in an expanded framework of human well-being which moves 
beyond the income dimension to a consideration of human capabilities and functionings. 
This, without a doubt, amounts to not much more than scratching the surface; but given 
the vastness of that surface, it is to be hoped that the exercise will have had something 
to offer to the reader who is looking for a helpful preliminary overview of the subject. 
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